The British party system is known for its discipline and cohesion, but it remains wedged on one issue: European integration. This was observed both in the days of the EEC in the 1970s and the EUMaastricht treaty in the 1990s; This work aims to investigate whether this holds true in the Brexit era. We utilise social network analysis to unpack the patterns of dissent and rebellion among pairs of MPs. Using data from Hansard, we compute similarity scores between pairs of MPs from June 2017 until April 2019 and visualise them in a force-directed network. Comparing Brexit-and non-Brexit divisions, we analyse whether patterns of voting similarity and polarity differ among pairs of MPs. Our results show that Brexit causes a wedge in party politics, consistent to what is observed in history.
The British party system is arguably one of the most successful in the world, and many scholars consider the party discipline in the House of Commons as a model that many Governments should follow. Throughout its contemporary history, the strong party values and ideologies that define its two main parties -Labour and Conservative-has lent credibility to the Parliamentary process, setting the landscape for the effective implementation of policies in the British government.
It is notable, however, that the cohesion and unity in the modern British party system is persistently wedged by one issue, which is that of European integration. It has come in various shapes and forms through the years. In the 1960s, as the European Union (EU) began to form, parties, and their members, were divided over whether the United Kingdom (UK) should join. Then, the early 1970s saw the rise of a eurosceptic -or anti-integration-rhetoric as it became increasingly apparent that the UK's membership in the European Economic Commission (EEC) was coming to fruition. The British party system was so fundamentally fragmented that in 1975, the House of Commons decided to put the UK's EEC membership to a referendum. At the time, the public vote was decisive: 67% of voters chose to continue its membership with the EEC. In the 1990s, euroscepticism reached new heights when then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher retracted her support for the European Union and questioned the priorities and direction of the EU moving forward. In her famous 1988 Bruges speech, she was critical about the proposal for a unified currency and warned against European socialism, causing much fragmentation in her Conservative party which eventually led to her ouster.
The eurosceptic sentiment continues to linger to the present day, and there is no clearer evidence than the results of the June 2016 referendum, which asked whether the UK should Leave or Remain as a member of European Union. This time, the results were a reversal of the outcome in 1975, as 51.9% of the electorate voted to Leave the EU. Now we enter an era more commonly known as "Brexit" (a portmanteau for the words Britain and Exit), and similar to preceding concerns on European integration, it is met with much skepticism and factionalisation among the Members of Parliament. To this day, MPs could not agree on a Brexit deal, while some MPs have gone as far as pushing for a second referendum.
Historical accounts have shown that the simplest expression of non-conformity by an MP is to cast a "rebellious" vote, or to vote against their party whip. In a chamber of 650 MPs, individual votes are largely invisible. But by expressing dissent and by defying party lines, MP rebels are given a voice and are empowered to influence other MPs to question policy and be critical. Thus, rebels and dissenters are given much attention particularly in instances when critical mass needs to be gathered in order to pass legislation, such as a Brexit deal. There are two questions that this research seeks to answer:
• RQ1: Is Brexit a challenge to the cohesion and solidarity in the British party system, consistent with the literature on legislative rebellion in the British parliament on European integration issues?
• RQ2: Can Social Network Analysis help us understand individual social dynamics in Parliament?
To answer the first research question, we begin by citing evidence supporting the notion that the British party system is a disciplined one and that MPs vote according to party lines. Then, we ask whether Brexit is an exception to this norm, by aiming to show evidence of dissent and rebellion among MPs. We present a historical account of party cohesion in the British legislative, and explain the reasons why scholars have a high regard for the party discipline in Parliament compared to party systems in other countries. We then follow with a discourse on legislative rebellions in contemporary British politics, from the post-war to the present, with particular focus on euroscepticism.
The second question is exploratory. To the extent of the literature on voting cohesion and dissent in Parliament, most empirical work rely on historical accounts and/or statistical methods aggregated to the party level. But the voting process is clearly a social one -because ultimately, the outcome of the matter depends on the actions of individual MPs and how they interact with each other. Through network analysis we seek to identify the rebels and understand their roles in the Brexit process.
While generally, rebellion and dissent implies voting against the party whip, in this paper we operationalise this concept in a slightly different way. We define rebellion and dissent among pairs of MPs as one of two forms: first, as a cross-party alliance, where an MP defies his/her own party whip and votes in coherence with another MP from a different party; and second, as a within-party conflict, where two MPs belong to the same party but vote differently. Using these definitions, the task, apart from establishing evidence of dissent and rebellion on Brexit-related legislation, is to identify the rebels or MPs with comparably higher levels of dissent. party system in the UK dates back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Beer, 1969) , and by the 1950s, the British system was recognised as the model of effective party discipline and parliamentary solidarity: Epstein (1956) considered British parliamentary cohesion as a "virtue," a prototype to emulate for other party systems that wish to reform (e.g., United States). He further noted that the strong support of MPs to their party is a key element that empowers British parties to effectively rally or enact programs following an election. Samuels (1969) supported this by saying that party loyalty is "the political cement of modern British politics," while Lazer (1969) regarded the British system as the "epitome of effective democratic government, in contrast to the instability of the French, and the complexity and lack of partisan principle of the Americans."
The early literature consistently mentions three reasons for the effective party discipline in the British parliament.
1. Structure, where the nature of the British constitution allows for a notable union between the executive and the legislative branches (Epstein, 1956; Samuels, 1969) .
2. Centralisation of political parties (Epstein, 1956; Samuels, 1969; Beer, 1969) , whereby homogeneity of interests and the orientation to national issues contribute to institutionalised norms of behaviour.
3. Strong partisan values and ideologies (Epstein, 1956; Samuels, 1969; Searing, 1978; Jackson, 1968) contribute to the sharp distinctions across parties.
With the growing narrative on the strong party system in the British parliament, scholars shifted to a more quantitative approach on the subject, offering methodological contributions and measurable evidences that aim to explain the strong cohesion in political parties. Searing (1978) demonstrated strong withinparty cohesion alongside cross-party polarisation. He interviewed 438 MPs, then employed a rank-order technique which discussed topics such as implicit values, political motivations and behaviour and showed that within-party cohesion is high and statistically significant at the 0.05 level, thus indicating solidarity within their respective political camps. Meanwhile, the Conservative and Labour parties were found to be "poles apart" and the difference in value comparisons showed strong significance at the 0.001 level. In 1984, Collie proposed a cross country systematic review, on the observation that the analytical work on legislative studies had shifted away from the "institutional-historical" to the behavioural. She particularly analysed collective and individual choices in legislative voting and found that compared to American settings, legislatures in Western Europe including Britain have consistently high levels of party cohesion, and thus most of the work on party behaviour have mostly focused on alignment rather than conflict. She further concluded that party affiliation is the single largest determinant in voting decisions in non-American legislature.
The observed cohesion in the British party system persists until today and is evident in recent empirical work, though there is growing evidence of within-party dissent in recent accounts (Collie, 1984; Cowley and Norton, 1999; Wood, 1982; Whiteley and Seyd, 1999; Plumb, 2013) . But in terms of discipline and party cohesion in more recent years, Raymond and Worth (2017) 's regression analysis of free votes -or unwhipped votes-on same-sex relations showed that MPs remain loyal and identified to their parties, even when controlling for party rhetoric and shared preferences. This is consistent with the finding by Pattie et al. (1998) , which showed that in free vote situations, the instinct of MPs is still to vote with their partymates, and concluded that party remains as the most powerful predictor of voting behaviour. Similarly, Norton (2003) and Russell (2014) demonstrated party unity and cohesion in a discipline-free environment, by studying the House of Lords, which is unique in its independence from the party whip. Norton used a standard measure in the literature -the Rice score of cohesion (Tzelgov, 2014; Garner and Letki, 2005; Sieberer, 2006; Rice, 1938) -and found "extraordinarily high" levels of cohesion among each of the three largest parties: the Conservatives, the Labour, and Liberal Democrats, and that the level of dissent is not any higher than what is observed in the House of Commons.
Compared to other countries, the contemporary British party system remains to be a paragon of cohesion. In a cross-country comparison of 11 parliamentary democracies around the decade 1990-2000, Sieberer (2006) used the Rice cohesion index to capture party solidarity, by calculating the frequency of dissenting behaviour in a party relative to the size of the dissenting bloc. He found that unity is very high across all countries surveyed, with the UK and Denmark achieving the highest unity scores, where out of 100 possible points, each scored above 99.
While the literature on British political solidarity remained considerably consistent through the years, several scholars note that the reasons that underpin these strong party lines are different from what was observed a few decades ago. For instance, Whiteley and Seyd (1999) , and Norton (1980) observed the shift away from a centralised view towards localism, in contrast to studies from more than half-a-century ago that suggest that political centralisation is a fundamental component in party cohesion (Beer, 1969; Epstein, 1956; Samuels, 1969) . Ironically, this pro-local sentiment was borne out of the centrism movement in the past, and that the ensuing neglect and devaluation of local parties led to resentment for the national (Whiteley and Seyd, 1999) . And while in the early literature, there was great emphasis on the impact of ideologies and values on party cohesion (Epstein, 1956; Samuels, 1969; Searing, 1978) , more recent studies emphasise the value of social interactions on voting behaviour. Norton (2003) , Hazan (2003) , and Russell (2014) mention the impact of prior socialisation -or attributes that are extra-parliamentary and learned by individuals outside of their exposure in the parliament. For instance, shared backgrounds, common past experiences, or other social interactions may manifest in voting behaviours. And when social interaction is linked to economic incentives such as rational choice, understanding the rationale behind party cohesion in today's British politics becomes more complex.
Rebellion and euroscepticism in the British legislative
Although the general observation in the Parliament is one of party solidarity, Collie (1984) noted that there have been varied and increasing accounts of withinparty dissent in contemporary British politics. Members of Parliament who are dissatisfied with their political party can express their dissent by voting against their party whip, and the MPs who frequently do so are considered rebels.
Notably, much of the literature surrounding party dissent and MP rebellion is linked to the issue of European integration (Moore, 2018; Wood, 1982; Tzelgov, 2014; Forster, 2002; Baker et al., 1999; Whiteley and Seyd, 1999) , to the extent that it had earned its own term, euroscepticism. There are two pivotal points in modern British political history where MPs were particularly wedged on the EU rhetoric: first when the UK joined the European Economic Community or EEC, a move which proved controversial that a referendum was called in 1975 to decide whether Britain should continue its membership; and second, in the 1990s when the Treaty on European Union, or Maastricht treaty, proposed to expand the EU's power, thus leading to the creation of a unified regional currency -now known as the Euro-of which the British opted out of.
Britain and post-war party rebellions
The history of dissent and within-party rebellion amongst MPs dates back to the post-war era. Jackson (1968) 's study of rebels and whips concluded that there were normally more rebellions in the parties when they are in office, rather than when they form the opposition. For instance, he found that in the years where the Labour party was in government , there were no significant Conservative rebellions, but a significant number of Labour rebellions. Meanwhile, when the Labour party was in opposition , they encountered the same problems as the previous years they were in power, but had very few revolts; the Conservative party, on the other hand, had notable increases in within-party dissent alongside its growing dominance in Parliament.
Britain and the European Economic Community
In the years that followed, divisiveness and within-party dissent amongst MPs mostly focused on the issue of European integration, beginning in the 1960s when the Conservative party successfully managed their own party dissent alongside Labour rebellion in the 1970s to negotiate the UK's membership into the Common Market (Baker et al., 1999) . However, the issue of European integration in the 1960-70s received very little academic attention until later years, most notably when Ashford (1980) concluded that the issue of Britain's European integration is the result of a "managed coalition" rather than a "stable hierarchy," and when Wood (1982) found that EU integration is "the only issue that has internally divided both left and right, and consistently over time."
In his factor analysis, Wood studied roll-call voting in the British and French parliaments in the years 1976-1978, particularly on European issues, where he clustered the divisions in the House of Commons, then assigned positive and negative weights to each yes and no vote, adjusted by the number of participants in the division. He concluded that issues surrounding direct elections to the European parliament cause much internal division among the left and the right MPs in both Britain and France. Meanwhile, in his analysis of euroscepticism in contemporary British politics, Forster (2002) found that between 1970-1972, Conservative rebels were successful in "establishing a crack, though not yet a split" in the unity of their party as regards the European issue. In addition, majority of Labour party was fundamentally fragmented: one-third voted against the Common Market, one-third voted for the Common Market, and one-third abstained. The failure of the opposition MPs to put a united stance thus forced the government to build Britain's EEC membership on weak foundations.
Britain and the Maastricht treaty
As European integration deepened in the 1980s, threats to Britain's solid party lines began to surface, but it was the "lethal combination" of the weak majority in Parliament that backed Britain's EU membership, and the opposition's newlyformed political discipline that led to the steady rise of dissent in government leadership particularly on the issues of European integration (Baker et al., 1999) . The eurosceptic sentiment elevated to new heights in the 1990s, with the negotiation of the Maastricht treaty. The influence of former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who originally supported Britain's membership to the EEC in 1973, notably opposed the idea of further EU integration in the final years of her leadership in the late 1980s, which led to a rise in dissenting behaviour and euroscepticism in the Conservative party. By the time that John Major had succeeded Margaret Thatcher as the Prime Minister of Britain in 1990, the Conservative party had been left "traumatised and deeply factionalised" as the issue of European integration was heavily used as a weapon in the campaigns of the party's leadership contenders (Forster, 2002) . Ultimately, the factions that emerged and the Maastricht rebellion that ensued left an indelible mark on John Major's leadership, that though his government was successful in passing the Maastricht bill to a slim majority in 1993, the issue of European integration had proved too divisive, forcing him to resign as leader of the Conservative Party in 1995. Cowley and Norton (1999) 's empirical analysis of rebellions in the British Parliament since 1945, showed that the level of dissent by government MPs around the time of the Maastricht treaty was second only to the level of dissent around the period of the EEC. Particularly, their detailed analysis of the divisions in 1992-1997 showed clear evidence that rebellions linked to the Maastricht treaty had far more greater participants than non-Maastricht treaty issues. This led them to conclude that the Maastricht rebellions could easily unseat the EEC rebellions of the 1970s as the "most persistent Conservative intra-party dissent in post-war history".
While most studies of euroscepticism utilise qualitative analysis or empirical analyses of surveys, Tzelgov (2014) studied the context and rhetoric surrounding European integration in the 1990s. First, he demonstrated using Rice cohesion scores that both Labour and Conservative parties faced low cohesion on issues of European integration, but very highly cohesive on others, consistent to what was observed by Cowley and Norton (1999) . He then performed a text analysis of party rhetoric, and showed differences in the topical usage between eurosceptics and europhiles, and between the Labour and Conservative parties: eurosceptics are more likely to use a nationalistic narrative, while the Labour party is more likely to pivot towards social issues.
Brexit
For many years, eurosceptics have long campaigned for a vote on whether the UK should renegotiate its terms with the EU. David Cameron, Britain's Prime Minister in 2010, promised to put forward a referendum on the UK's EU membership should he be reelected. On his reelection, he fulfilled his promise of a vote, and despite his' and the Conservative party's campaign to Remain, on June 23, 2016, 51.9% of the voting public voted in favour of leaving the European Union, while 48.1% voted to remain (Electoral Commission, 2016) .
Because Brexit is an ongoing saga and key events in the House of Commons have yet to unfold, most of the academic literature surrounding Brexit focus on party-affiliated public opinion rather than MP voting dynamics. Many studies on public voting behaviour related to Brexit show strong polarisation. Motivated by the voter outcome on the Brexit referendum, Surridge (2018) analysed data from the British Election studies, from 1992 to 2017, and found that the leftright ideological distance between Conservatives and Labour was on a declining trend from 1992 until 2005, but the gap reopened in 2010, and now, in 2017, the ideological split is back on its highest level since 1992. Meanwhile, Stokes (2016) conducted a survey of 10,491 respondents from 10 EU countries in 2016 on their views on euroscepticism post-Brexit referendum. In his analysis he found that the UK had the largest ideological split on EU matters. Similarly, on the question on whether some powers should be returned to national governments, the ideological split of UK left-leaning and right-leaning respondents were the highest, and significantly higher than the rest of the 9 countries sampled. Also, Vasilopoulou (2016) performed a multivariate statistical analysis of Brexit support by the public, and found that left-right ideologies were a good indicator of Brexit support, but not a particular party affiliation. Lynch and Whitaker (2018) studied the extent to which Brexit drove changes within the Conservative party, analysing how each of 330 Conservative MP's voted in the referendum in relation to their previous eurosceptic positions. Using regression analyses, they found that the more rebellious a Conservative MP was in 2010 to 2016, the more likely he/she is to be a Hard Brexiteer, or to vote Leave in the 2016 referendum. Meanwhile, they also found that the Conservative party's Remain campaign was supported by a number of "reluctant Remainers" -eurosceptics or soft Brexiteers whose decision to vote Remain had been difficult. Hence, the referendum's Leave outcome became an opportunity for the Hard Brexiteers and the "reluctant Remainers" to come together. In a similar study, Moore (2018) tried to understand the motivations behind the dissent among Conservative MPs in the 2016 referendum. He found that policy-seeking behaviour, loosely linked to an MP's eurosceptic position, had a strong statistical influence on a Leave endorsement. Office-seeking motivations also were found to be influential in the voting decision, where frontbenchers were more likely to be loyal to the Prime Minister and vote Remain, while seasoned backbenchers were more likely to defy and vote Leave. Finally, in terms of vote-seeking, he found evidence that a constituency's eurosceptic position may influence a Conservative MP to cast a rebellious vote.
The academic work on party cohesion in the British legislative is extensive and varied, however we find that two important gaps need to be addressed. First, is the gap in the timeline. Research on party cohesion is disproportionately heavy in the earlier days, while not much is written in reference to the Brexit era. The second gap in the literature is that the work on individual choice is limited. The literature mentions that contemporary British politics has notably moved from centralism (or the national) towards localism (or the individual constituencies), and that MPs put greater emphasis on social interactions than in the past. It is also noted that ideological splits, rather than party affiliation, may better explain current voting dynamics. Hence, while aggregate tools of party solidarity remain relevant, it is also important to complement these tools with methods that consider the shifting behaviour and incentives of individual MPs.
Data and Methods

Data
For this work, we utilise data from Hansard, the official central repository of all UK Parliamentary records. Hansard provides comprehensive and verbatim information on Parliament debates, divisions, petitions, and statements, for both the House of Commons and the House of Lords. The digitalised database of division voting started in March 2016, and is made available for download through the data.parliament.uk website. We begin the analysis with a dataset of divisions in the House of Commons for only the 57th Parliament, which is the legislature immediately following the Brexit referendum and the consequent General Election on 8 June 2017. It began on 21 st June, 2017 until until 10 th April, two months before Theresa May including a total of 414 divisions. Committee divisions, which tackle particular areas of interest, were excluded from the analysis. The list of divisions is taken from http://explore.data.parliament.uk/, where each division in the House of Commons is recorded in a CSV file, tagged with a unique ID, a unique URL which contains detailed information (such as the voting record), and the title of the divisions.
From this list of divisions, we identify the 414 that belong to the 57th Parliament. As this analysis primarily seeks to compare MP voting patterns between Brexit and non-Brexit divisions, each of the 414 need to be classified and grouped accordingly. Thus, inferring from the titles of each division, we manually label and classify them as Brexit or non-Brexit. For instance, any division that mentions the words: EU exit, EU withdrawal, Brexit, and other related keywords in their title were tagged as Brexit divisions. In total, out of the 414, there were 192 divisions classifed as Brexit and 222 non-Brexit. Then, to gather the names of every MPs who voted "Aye" or "No" on each of the 414 divisions, we built a web crawler that would access the unique URLs provided for each of the 414 divisions, then parse the information on the voting results.
MPs either belong to a political party or are Independent. For this study, the breakdown of 650 MPs by political party are: 317 from the Conservative Party, 254 from the Labour Party, 35 from SNP or the Scottish National Party, 11 from the Liberal Democrats, 10 from the DUP or Democratic Unionist Party (of Northern Ireland), 7 from Sinn Féin, 4 from Plaid Cymru (or the Party of Wales), 1 from the Green Party, and 11 Independent. Out of the 650, two from the Conservative and two from the Labour party do not vote as the Speaker and 3 Deputy Speakers of the House, while the 7 Sinn Féin are absentionists and do not take their seats in the House of Commons; hence there are 639 voting MPs. Because Hansard only records the MPs who voted "Ayes" or "Noes," MPs that were missing from either were presumed to not have voted on the division. This is the main dataset that we use for the analysis.
Each of the political parties classify themselves on an ideological spectrum from left to right. Traditionally, the two largest parties, Labour and Conservative, are on the left and the right, respectively. The DUP, which entered into a coalition with the Conservative Party in 2017, is also on the Right-wing; while the other Opposition parties are on the Left-wing. The political party breakdown of the 639 voting MPs is provided in Table 1 . We also note where each political party lies on the political spectrum. For each of the 11 Independent MPs who, by definition is not affiliated (and not to be confused with the UKIP, or UK Independence Party), we labelled their ideology by their prior political affiliation: one Independent MP was formerly from the Conservative Party, while 8 were formerly Labour, and one was a former Liberal Democrat.
There is one Independent candidate who was formerly from a lesser-known Northern Ireland party -the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)-and classifying this required further scrutiny. The UUP identifies itself with the Conservative Party, which warrants a Right-wing label, however the MP, Lady Hermon, has in fact quit the UUP for her refusal to support the Conservatives (BBC, 2010 
Methods
Voting counts
We organise the data into a 639 × 414 matrix, refer to Figure 1 The next step is to sub-divide the matrix into the Brexit and the non-Brexit divisions. As mentioned earlier, these were classified manually according to the mention of EU exit, withdrawal, or related words in their division title. Splitting the big matrix results in two smaller matrices with sizes 639 × 192 containing the Brexit divisions, and 639 × 222 containing the non-Brexit divisions. We then transform each of these two smaller matrices into a similarity matrix, where the elements of each matrix refer to the number of instances that that two MPs voted similarly minus the number of times that they voted dissimilar to each other. In matrix form, this is defined as the sum product of the matrix A multiplied its transpose:
where A = {a 11 , a 12 , a 13 , ..., a nn }, and n = 192, if Brexit 222, non-Brexit By this definition, both the Brexit and the non-Brexit case will have a resulting square matrix with dimension 639 × 639, with names of MPs on both the rows and the columns, and elements of each matrix indicate voting similarities amongst pairs of MPs: a high positive number indicates that the pair voted similarly together; while a large negative value suggests voting polarity. The square matrix is naturally symmetric along the main diagonal. 
Cosine similarity
It can be observed that the similarity matrix in Figure 2 treats some votes (e.g., −1,0,+1) equally, even if an MP did not vote on a division, and analysing it this way could be misleading: for instance, a score of +100 in Figure 2 could either be the sum of two MPs voting similarly minus the instances that they voted dissimilarly (i.e., 130 − 30 = 100), but it could also be the case that one MP had only voted on 100 divisions, abstained on the rest, and voted similarly 100% of the time with another MP (i.e., 100 − 0 = 100). Arguably, the voting similarity of the latter case is stronger than the former. Hence, the similarity score must be weighted by the frequency of votes cast by each MP for the study period. Empirically, this means that MPs have varying vector densities depending on their voting frequency, which is a reasonable assumption to make considering that the main diagonal of the matrix in Figure 2 are not equal. The cosine similarity formula, which projects a pair of vectors in multidimensional space, can measure the similarity of each pair of MPs, controlling for the differences in the number of non-zero elements in the vectors: Each vector pair (i.e., pair of MPs) is given a cosine similarity score between −1 (full dissimilarity) and +1 (full similarity). A value of 0 means no correlation. Refer to Figure 3 for the cosine similarity transformation of the Brexit case.
Figure 3: A sample of cosine similarity matrix for the Brexit case. The full matrix size is 639 × 639, and the values of this matrix range from −1 (full dissimilarity) to +1 (full similarity).
Party similarity
Recall that we define rebellion by voting coherence of MPs belonging to different parties (cross-party alliance) or voting polarities of MPs belonging to the same party (within-party conflict). The cosine similarity matrix only establishes the voting coherence or voting polarity, but does not indicate anything on the party similarities between pairs of MPs. Hence, we define a reference party similarity matrix and compare the cosine similarity matrix to it. Consider a 639 × 639 matrix with entries of +1, if the MP pair belongs to the same political party; or −1, if the MP pair does not belong to the same party. Note that there are 8 parties (excluding Sinn Féin) in the analysis: Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrats, DUP, SNP, Plaid Cymru, Green Party, and Independent; though this matrix could also be prepared for a two-ideology case (Left-wing and Right-wing). The party similarity matrix is the same for the Brexit, and the non-Brexit case. Refer to Figure 4 for a visualisation of the 8 party case.
Figure 4: A sample of the party similarity matrix (identical for both the Brexit and non-Brexit case). The full matrix size is 639 × 639, and the values of this matrix are either −1 (party dissimilarity) or +1 (party similarity).
Party-adjusted voting similarity matrix
Finally, we compare the cosine similarity matrix with the party similarity matrix by subtracting the latter from the former for both Brexit and non-Brexit divisions. The final result are two 639 × 639 matrices (see Figure 5 ). The elements of either matrix have a range of values from −2 to +2, centred on zero. These values indicate the magnitude by which the voting similarity between a pair of MPs is explained by their party. For instance, a value that is equal to zero means that the voting similarity between MPs is fully explained by their party similarity. As values move further away from zero, this means that the party affiliations have less power in explaining the voting similarity/dissimilarity among pairs of MPs.
Thus, the non-zero values in the matrix imply varying deviations from voting patterns expected by the party affiliations. Values that are near-zero, for instance, mean that voting (dis)similarity is -for the most part-explained by the party (dis)similarity. Of interest to this study are the cases where the MPs' voting (dis)similarity is not explained by their party affiliations. These are the values that in Figure 5 deviate the farthest away from zero, towards the end of the range [−2, +2]. Values close to −2 is an indication of a within-party conflict, or a pair of MPs that voted dissimilarly despite belonging to the same party, while values close to +2 is an indication of a cross-party alliance, or a pair of MPs that voted cohesively despite belonging to different parties.
Figure 5: A sample of the final adjusted voting similarity score matrix (Brexit case). The full matrix size is 639 × 639, and the values of this matrix range from −2 (within party conflicts) to +2 (cross-party alliances).
Network representation
Finally, the result in Figure 5 is a square matrix with a zero main diagonal and symmetric entries, which is equivalent to the adjacency matrix of an undirected graph. The row and column labels (which are the names of the MPs) are the nodes of the network, while the elements of the matrix are the edges -they refer to the party-adjusted voting similarity or dissimilarity of each pair of nodes (or pair of MPs). One can then visualise the adjacency matrix shown in Figure 5 to a network, where each node represents an MP, and the elements of the adjacency matrix suggests the relationship between node pairs: strong negative values indicate polar opposites (or within-party conflict), while strong positive values mean cohesion (or cross-party alliance).
The algorithm used in this thesis is Jacomy et al. (2014)'s ForceAtlas2 layout and is implemented through the software Gephi. The basic idea of the algorithm is similar to a magnetic force wherein nodes that are polar opposites represent repulsion, while cohesive nodes represent attraction. Hence, if a pair of MPs correspond to a high negative score (within-party conflict) in the adjacency matrix, the forcedirected algorithm will pull them far apart in the network space. Meanwhile, a pair of MPs that correspond to a high positive score (cross-party alliance) in the adjacency matrix are expected to be pushed closer together. See Supplementary Material for more details.
Results and Discussion
Party-adjusted voting similarity matrices
In Figure 6 , we show a histogram of the elements of the matrix from the partyadjusted voting similarity matrix for each of the Brexit and the non-Brexit cases. The two types of dissent are presented in the histogram as follows. Values that are greater than or equal to 1 are cross-party alliances, or two MPs that belong to different parties but voted cohesively. On the other extreme, values that are less than or equal to −1 signal within-party conflicts, or two MPs that belong to the same party but voted opposite. There are two things that can be inferred from Figure 6 : first, there are comparatively higher levels of cross-party alliances than within-party conflicts; second, and more importantly, it can be observed that there is a larger frequency of within-party conflicts on Brexit-related divisions compared to non-Brexit, which is in line with the literature on party rebellion particularly on issues of European integration.
Network projection
We visualise the extreme values, i.e. ≥ 1 (cross-party alliances) and ≤ −1 (withinparty conflicts) in Figure 7 . It can be observed that for the top graph, which represents the non-Brexit divisions, there are two distinct clusters, one largely blue, and the other is largely red; and the nodes that reside in each cluster are connected by dense green edges. Meanwhile, there are very few cross-cluster connections (mostly related to Liberal Democrat MPs).
The the non-Brexit graph suggests strong party discipline within each of the two main parties, Conservative and Labour. Conservative nodes tend to cluster together, while Labour nodes (and other parties in opposition) are in the other cluster. This means that for non-Brexit divisions, MPs vote largely within their party lines, and very rarely do they rebel and cross to the other cluster. One can also infer the cross-party alliances from the graph. For instance, the DUP and the Conservative are clustered together, which verifies their voting coalition. Meanwhile, the Labour, Plaid Cymru, Green, and SNP, are on the other cluster, which suggests a united opposition when voting in Parliament on non-Brexit divisions; and Liberal Democrats split between the two camps. This is a stark contrast to the Brexit divisions, the bottom graph of Figure  7 . There is evidently greater cross-cluster interaction, which is an indication that party lines are blurred. The red edges suggest within-party conflict. This means that there are a number of MPs that rebel from the cluster discipline and are pulled apart. For example, some nodes representing Labour MPs have moved within the cluster space of the Conservative party, which indicates that these MPs have voted more cohesively with the Conservative rhetoric, and thus expressing strong repulsion to MPs from their own party. Also, cross-party alliances may occur among pairs of ideologically polarised MPs; several nodes representing the Conservative MPs are being pushed to the centre towards the Labour cluster.
These results are however largely influenced by the number of political parties in the analysis. Mainly, the cross-party alliances occur almost exclusively within the ideological cluster, and does not necessarily signify rebellion. In order to distinguish the true rebellions from the effect of ideological cohesion from multiple parties, we relabel the party similarity matrix to indicate ideological affiliation (Left-or Right-wing) rather than the original 8-political party classification. The analysis based on the 2-ideology case is also backed by recent studies that find ideology as a determinant of Brexit support (Vasilopoulou, 2016; Surridge, 2018) .
Ideology-adjusted voting similarity matrices
In Figure 6 (right), we show the histogram of a two-ideology case, where Conservatives and the DUP, plus one independent MP were classified as Right-wing; while the rest of the MPs were classified as Left-wing. Re-labelling each MP by ideology rather than by political party gives a clearer and more striking result. It appears that the cross-party alliances and within-party conflicts in the non-Brexit case completely disappear when re-labelling the MPs by Left or Right. On the other hand, the Brexit case continues to identify instances of rebellion on both cross-party alliances and within-party conflicts. In Figure 8 , we graph the extreme values of the histogram in Figure 6 (right), i.e. ≤ −1 (within-party conflicts), and ≥ 1 (cross-party alliances). It is evident that in the top graph that represents the non-Brexit case, there is no rebellion. The absence of edges in the top graph of Figure 8 means that each MP voted within expectation: they voted mostly within their ideological rhetoric.
For the Brexit-related divisions, the re-labelling from 8 parties to 2 ideologies gives us a clearer picture, and helps us understand the movement of the rebels and dissenters more visibly, as seen in the bottom graph of Figure 8 . We can clearly identify that there are four dissenting MPs from the Left-wing who closely align with the Right on Brexit-related issues. These rebels form cross-party alliances with the Right-wing, which explains their position in the graph and the green edges that link them to the Right-wing MPs. As a direct result, these Left-wing rebels have a red edge to other members of the Left-wing, which represent differences on Brexit-related ideologies. The same holds true for the Right-wing dissenters. Their position in the graph may give an indication of their level of dissent: some nodes are spatially clustered to the Left-wing, while some Right-wing MPs are more "on the fence" but are slowly being pushed to the Left.
The rebels
By visual inspection of Figure 8 , we identify sixteen nodes that are located far from their cluster. There are 16 rebels, five from the Right-wing and eleven from the Left-wing. Interestingly, this is in contrast to the historical observation made by Jackson (1968) on post-war rebels and whips, where he mentioned that the ruling party is observed to have more rebellions than the opposition party, but consistent with Forster (2002) 's study on euroscepticism in contemporary British politics, where he noted that the factionalisation of the opposition and its failure to capitalise on the weaknesses of the ruling party may result in a fundamentally weak Government. Here, we analyse the role of each of these MPs in Brexit debates which warrants their position as dissenters. In Figure 9 (top), we replicate the visualisation of the two-ideology network, however with greater emphasis on the MPs that were identified as rebels.
Change UK
The network was able to pinpoint four MP dissenters who eventually formed the breakaway party Change UK in February 2019, three months before Theresa May Figure 8 : Network projection of dissent and rebellion for non-Brexit (top) and Brexit divisions (bottom), for the 2 political ideology case. Each node denotes an MP, connected by an edge to another MP. The colour of the edge represents whether the connection is a repulsive (pull) or attractive (push) force. Node colours denote ideological affiliation. announced her resignation as Prime Minister. According to party member Chuka, Change UK is a pro-EU party whose members had left the more established political parties "to build an alternative to broken politics"; many members identify with a centre-left or centre-right position (Umunna, 2019) . At its peak, the party had 11 members: 3 were former Conservative MPs and 8 were formerly Labour; the network visualisation was able to identify all three conservative rebels, and one labour rebel. Not surprisingly, Change UK leader Anna Soubry, the former Conservative party MP could be seen at the opposite end of her original cluster, alongside the cluster that is heavily dominated by the Left-wing ideology, which is known for its pro-EU stance. Meanwhile, Heidi Allen and Sarah Wollaston, also former Conservative MPs, are notably removed from their original Right-wing cluster hovering towards the centre-Left. Luciana Berger, a Labour MP who joined Change UK, has also noticeably broken away from the Left and spatially closer to the other three Change UK members.
Father of the House
Kenneth Clarke is a Conservative MP whose position in the network can also be found on the opposite end of his expected cluster alongside the Labour and other Left-wing MPs. He is the "Father of the House," a title traditionally bestowed on the longest-serving MP, and has served five Conservative prime ministers -Heath, Thatcher, Major, Cameron, and May-since the 1970s. Kenneth Clarke is known for his "extraordinary consistency" over Europe (Orchard, 2018) . He has always adamantly voted to remain in the EU, and has hinted that his steadfast pro-European stance may have cost him his three failed campaigns to lead the Conservative party. He is quoted as saying: "I could not see the slightest point in trying to become leader of the party -and one therefore hoped Prime Minister-on a platform which I didn't actually agree with", making him an admired figure in Parliament particularly with the younger generation for his principled bearing.
Labour troublemakers
Three Labour MPs identified by the network: Kate Hoey, Frank Field, and Graham Stringer, are prominent hard-Brexit supporters, which justifies their node location in the graph, which is embedded in the Right-wing cluster. The fourth rebel node in the Right-wing cluster is pro-Brexit MP Kelvin Hopkins, currently Independent but only because he was suspended from the Labour party. In 2018, they were known to be the only four Labour MPs backing the Government's Brexit agenda (McDonald, 2018) .
Kate Hoey is arguably the most prominent Labour Brexiteer (Dickson, 2017) and has been named as one of 40 Brexit troublemakers by Politico, a prominent international political newspaper. Born in Northern Ireland, she has oftentimes shown sympathy with the Right-wing DUP, and is known to defy the Labour whip on a number of occasions (DeSmog UK, 2019) . Frank Field is said to have made a name for himself as an "independent thinker" (Hanley, 2018) though his loyalty to the Labour party has always been suspect. The MP's views is known to have been incompatible with the Labour's values long before Brexit. As such, he was also named by Politico as one of its 40 Brexit troublemakers (Dickson, 2017) for his dissenting opinions with his own party membership. Similarly, Graham Stringer is a known Brexiteer from the Labour party and along with Kate Hoey, he has repeatedly called for the support of his partymates to the Brexit process, citing "real peril" for the Labour party if they appear keen to stop it (Hoey and Stringer, 2019) .
On the fence I voted to remain, but the people voted to leave in 2016. My constituency voted to leave by a margin of 55/45. We said we would honour the outcome of the referendum, and so we must.
Sir Gary Streeter, 2019 Sir Gary Streeter's curious position on the network straddles between the two clusters, and his stance on Brexit reflects this. He is a Conservative MP that voted to remain during the 2016 referendum, but his constituency voted to leave. As opinion in his constituency remains "deeply divided," it appears from the network analysis that so does he.
I'm in a leave constituency, but I would do what's right.
MP David Hanson, 2019
Meanwhile, Labour MP David Hanson is in a similar conundrum. He voted Remain, consistent with the current Labour party rhetoric, but his constituency voted for Brexit. His place in the network reflects this position, which is removed from the cluster but still largely aligned to the Left. He is known to have said that "I promised everyone in [my constituency] Delyn that I would never vote for something that made them poorer... It is my job to try and navigate a way forward that respects the wishes of 100% of constituents (Hanson, 2019) ." MP Hanson's place in the network (see Figure 9 ) is visibly shared with six other Labour MPs: Ruth Jones, Sir David Crausby, Luciana Berger, Emma Reynolds, Keith Vaz and Ian Austin. With the exception of Luciana Berger, which I noted earlier is part of the Change UK movement, all the other five MPs, like David Hanson, are pro-Remain Labour MPs but serve Leave-voting constituencies. Ruth Jones' constituency, Newport West, has long been a Labour stronghold, but voted to Leave by a margin of 56-44 (Forrest, 2019) . Similarly, Sir David Crausby of Bolton Northeast, Emma Reynolds of Wolverhampton Northeast, and Keith Vaz of Leicester East, all belong to constituencies that voted for Brexit. Ian Austin, an Independent MP but formerly affiliated with the Labour party, can be seen as further removed from the cluster but still largely ideologically aligned to the Left. His constituency, Dudley North, also chose to Leave.
Rebellion scores
Finally, we define a rebellion score for each MP by taking the absolute value of each element of the matrix in Figure 5 (only for the Brexit divisions) then taking the sum of every row. The final vector will have a dimension of 639 × 1, where each element represents an MP's rebellion score, or the magnitude of an MP's withinparty conflicts and cross-party alliances. Finally, rebellion scores were normalised between zero and one. As a form of robustness, we compare the rebels identified from the visual inspection with the rebels identified using the rebellion scores metric. Table 2 shows the top 20 rebels by rebellion score. Generally, MPs were found to have low rebellion scores: the mean rebellion score for all 639 MPs is 0.05, and the median is 0.03. But on the top of the list is Kate Hoey, the Labour MP from Vauxhall who is also a Hard Brexit advocate; she was also identified as a rebel in the network visualisation.
Aside from MP Kate Hoey, there are also notable overlaps between the MPs with the highest rebellion score, and the rebel MPs identified using a visual inspection of the network. Of the 16 rebels identified by visual inspection, 10 of them also have the highest rebellion scores. In Figure 9 (lower panel), we plot all the rebels identified by visual inspection and/or rebel score. From the visualisation, it is evident that the high-scoring rebels belong to a sub-cluster that is slightly detached from the main ideological cluster. A closer examination shows that these high-scoring rebels support their party's ideological rhetoric, but only to a certain extent; In particular, these rebels were found to have similar thoughts on a no-deal Brexit scenario. For example, the sub-cluster of Labour MPs on the left wing (e.g. John Mann, Kevin Barron, Ronnie Campbell) were all part of a rebellion that resulted in a failed bid by the opposition to block a no-deal Brexit in June 2019 (Mairs, 2019) . Meanwhile, the rebels on the right-wing sub-cluster were all found to be notably opposed to a no-deal Brexit. Particularly, 4 of the 5 MPs in this sub-cluster were former ministers in the Theresa May cabinet who now are voting against the Government.
MP
Conclusion
In this study, we showed that Brexit is consistent with the other issues of European integration in the past, in that it creates a wedge in Parliament. Addressing the first research question, we reported that there is a strong disparity in MP voting on Brexit divisions compared to non-Brexit. The network analysis showed that while there are two distinct (ideology) clusters on both the Brexit and the nonBrexit case, the inter-connectivities across these clusters differ significantly. In non-Brexit divisions, it is almost certain that MPs follow the party rhetoric, and defying the party whip is largely negligible. As demonstrated by the network visualisation, most cross-party alliances happen within one cluster only and rarely does it ever cross to the other side. Meanwhile, within-party conflicts are also very minimal. On the other hand, in the Brexit divisions, there was a visible blurring of the party line, and cross-cluster interaction is obvious and apparent. There exists strong repulsion across various node pairs, and while in the non-Brexit case, cross-party alliances only happen within a cluster, it is evident that in the Brexit case, cross-party alliances could happen across two clusters that intuitively have polarised ideological beliefs. In relation to the second research question, we were able to focus on the results at the node level which allows us to investigate the MP's identified as rebels. We found that these MPs were the subsequent members of the breakaway party Change UK, a few notable MP "troublemakers" and some MPs who were faced with a moral decision to either support their party lines, or their people's vote. To summarise, the main findings of this study are:
1. Brexit, similar to past issues of European integration, is a challenge to the cohesion and solidarity of the British party system.
2. Social network analysis helped us visually identify sixteen MP rebels, and through further analysis, their positions in the network are justified by their ideology.
European integration has long been a persistent wedge issue in the British parliament. Throughout the contemporary history of the British political system, from the 1960s until today, the topic of euroscepticism has remained a challenge to the renowned party system in the UK. Our primary contribution is to connect the literature on Eurosceptic rebellion to the present time, by demonstrating that Brexit-related dissent is similar to the Parliament's past experiences with European integration. The study of dissent and rebellion is not a new concept, but through social network analysis we aim to bring new perspectives. This alternative methodology is our second contribution to the literature. After all, the voting process is a social phenomenon, and the understanding of rebellion in Parliament goes beyond knowing whether dissent is high or if cohesion levels within parties are low. Especially in today's localism-focused politics, what adds value is our understanding of the dynamics behind every MP's vote, and to unlock patterns that may offer clues on what happens next. When faced with uncertainty, learning that there are splits and factions in the party system is already after-the-fact and contributes very little in the action plan to move forward. But understanding the interactions of individuals on a granularised (division) level can provide an ample road map to overcome the challenges in the legislative process.
We can count few limitations in our approach. First, it is by no means causal. While we can identify the rebels by visual inspection of their voting behaviour, whether or not the MP will actually leave his/her party remains to be seen. In this thesis we have presented an ex-post analysis of the rebels, but it is recommended that the social network analysis is supplemented by other quantitative approaches that specialise in causal inference. Second, by taking a granular approach, one may overlook the benefits of using a simpler and uncomplicated measure of party cohesion. For instance, traditional aggregated approaches may be easier to interpret as it is computationally convenient and most information is condensed to a single number (e.g. a party cohesion score), whereas in producing the network, or a rebellion score for each MP may entail complex calculations and matrix transformations that may be difficult to disentangle. In this analysis we tried to bridge this complexity gap by producing visual representations of the network, but the process of generating it may not necessarily be straightforward.
The main implication of this analysis is that the issue of European integration continues to linger until the present, and that euroscepticism still casts a long shadow in the House of Commons. If there are lessons to be learned from the past, it is that dissent and rebellion bear large consequences, because the Government must carry on despite it, and legislation will be passed on a minority and weak foundation. Our immediate experience does not give us much credence, as transition governments following a period of fragmentation are likely to be just that -a transition period. But on the other hand, given today's empirical methods, we no longer are limited to using past experiences as our benchmark of the future. The record-keeping of the UK Parliament is one of the most modern, and comprehensive systems available for public sector data. The power of computing and contemporary tools such as social network analysis allows us to uncover the massive information that is available to us, and gives us a more informed understanding of our present.
Using the results of this social network analysis demonstrates that the Parliament, and policymakers, can better anticipate signals of rebellious behaviours, and better identify the key influencers in the legislative process. As voting on House divisions is fundamentally a social act, it is but natural to understand the social dynamics and the interrelations amongst the members of the Chamber. This method may very well be generalisable in other complex routinary political processes that involve social dynamics and multiple stakeholders. It goes without saying that the issue of Brexit affects all of us. Our future lies in the people we elect and we trust that they will make the right decisions that reflect our true interests. But as Her Majesty's Government is faced with more indecision and uncertainty, the longer we wait to resolve this issue, the greater risk and vulnerability that it will be harder to solve. Perhaps through our understanding of social dynamics we gain a revealed insight into the ideologies of the people we elect and obtain a better grasp on how they shape the future of this country.
Meanwhile, the repulsion force F d between two nodes a and b is a function of their weighted distance, each node's number of links (i.e. the degree) and a parameter k r : where k r are user-defined settings on the gravity and scaling of the network
The other details in the network implementation are as follows. For full definitions and explanations for each parameter, refer to Jacomy et al. (2014) .
• Number of threads imply more speed (more multithreading jobs). The setting was set to 3.
• Tolerance implies the amount of swinging, and a lower number implies more precision. The setting was 1 (default).
• Scaling is the repulsion parameter of the graph, where higher numbers show greater sparsity. The setting was set to 2.
• Gravity attracts nodes to the center, and prevents nodes from drifting. The setting was default (1).
• Edge weight influence was set to "normal." The other option was "no influence."
